RESUMEN:
Chesterman, siguiendo a Alison Dundes Renteln, cree posible una fundamentación relativista de los derechos humanos (???)

TEXTUAL:
Increasingly, however, it has been argued that some form of ‘cultural relativism’ is not incompatible with the articulation of ‘human’ rights. Alison Dundes Renteln, for example, claims that human rights can be discussed using the concept of ‘ethical relativism’, a subset of cultural relativism.[27] Such a framework holds that ‘there can be no value judgments that are true, that is, objectively justifiable, independent of specific cultures’.[28] Within such a paradigm, however, she maintains that cross-cultural study reveals that all cultures share certain common values that can provide a global consensus for human rights.[29] Renteln argues that relativists in the past have incorrectly linked the relativity of moral values and the ideals of toleration and objectivity. She argues instead that relativism is primarily a ‘meta-ethical theory’ empowered by the realisation that moral judgments are the product of ethnocentricity and enculturation (the process by which people unconsciously acquire the moral values of their own culture and accept them as universal truths). On this basis, she seeks to justify certain forms of external critique of specific human rights practices, while insisting on the ultimate relativity of values.



[27] Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1990), p. 69.

[28] Ibid., p. 71, quoting Paul F Schmidt, ‘Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism’, Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 52, 1955), p. 780, 782

[29] Renteln, op. cit., in note 27, p. 86.

FUENTE:
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture, Ed., 1998 I The Age of Rights: Bobbio and the Search for Foundations. A Human Nature and Cultural Relativism

FUENTE AMPLIADA:
CHESTERMAN, Simon: Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture Ed. , , 1998