By Diego Poole

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Lecture delivered at Christendom College, Front Royal, Virginia, US, on September 24, 2024.

Accepted in 2025 for publication in Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie

This article critically examines the liberal individualist foundation of human rights, contrasts it with classical natural law, and proposes an alternative realist conception of rights. The critique highlights the limitations of human rights philosophy, including its detachment from social reality, its ideological underpinnings, and its inherent contradictions. The liberal perspective, which prioritizes individual autonomy over the common good, is incompatible with a realist understanding of rights as part of the common good of a political and concrete community. The study proposes that rights must be contextually defined and grounded in shared social projects, challenging the universalist and absolutist assumptions of contemporary declarations.

Human rights, Liberal individualism, Natural law, Natural rights, Common good, Classical realism, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Autonomy and freedom