This chapter examines the contrast between Aristotle’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conceptions of nature and analyzes how these different anthropological frameworks shape their respective understandings of equality among human beings. Rousseau conceives nature as the original and spontaneous condition of humanity prior to the development of society and culture. From this perspective, culture appears as a system of conventions that introduces hierarchy, dependence on the opinions of others, and forms of social inequality that corrupt the original equality of the state of nature. By contrast, Aristotle understands nature not as a primitive pre-social state but as a dynamic principle oriented toward fulfillment. According to Aristotle, culture and political life do not oppose nature but perfect it, enabling individuals to actualize their capacities within the ordered structure of the polis. Consequently, equality is not defined as the absence of differences but as a proportional relation in which individuals occupy their proper place within a natural and social order directed toward the common good. The opposition between Rousseau’s and Aristotle’s notions of equality can only be fully understood through their deeper conceptions of the relationship between nature and culture. Our objective is neither philological nor historical. We do not intend to analyze the influence that both authors had, nor who influenced them. Our objective is truly philosophical: to understand the reality of this relationship between nature and culture. The recourse to Rousseau, to Aristotle, or to St. Thomas himself (the best interpreter of Aristotle), is instrumental to our main purpose.

Chapter of a book to be published by Springer in 2026, in a joint publication by professors from various universities around the world who participated in the World Congress of Philosophy of Law held in Seoul in July 2024.

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