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In short, if God wishes to share his good with a potential intellectual nature, like ours, then this nature must have the various powers that we find ourselves to have. God is not constrained to make such a nature, but if he wishes to share his good, then

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228 In short, if God wishes to share his good with a potential intellectual nature, like ours, then this nature must have the various powers that we find ourselves to have. God is not constrained to make such a nature, but if he wishes to share his good, then this is the nature he wishes to make.1 Part of what it means to have this nature is to have inclinations. A human nature is not some math...
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The new natural law theory provides no way of reconciling conflicting desire

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217 The new natural law theory provides no way of reconciling conflicting desires for basic goods. Anna now desires knowledge and she also desires play, both of which have been described as basic goods within the new natural law theory. Which does she choose, since she cannot do both at once? If she has an ultimate end to which she can compare them, then she has a means of determining which is ...
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Reason is a standard of natural law only to the degree that it discovers the standard of natura

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191 Of course, reason has an obvious role to play within descriptivism or naturalism. It discovers the good and evil of nature and presents it to the will. As such, it becomes a kind of conduit or messenger between nature and will. Nature is the true standard of human actions; reason is a standard only to the degree that it discovers the standard of nature. Aquinas himself says that reason is t...
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El Bien como el fin último, no es un bien premoral, sino la plenitud del bien moral

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9.2.1: The Good as the Ultimate End p. 182 y 183 For Germain Grisez and the new natural law theorists, the good refers to a formality, a formality that characterizes all human actions, whether sinful or virtuous." Even the adulterer pursues the good, for he hopes to gain the good of pleasure through his action. As such, li, the first principle of practical reason is premoral; it does not direct...
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La ley es obligatoria porque dispone hacia un fin común que es el bien natural del hombre

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1I68 When we say that hypothetical ought-statements are optional, we have the first kind in mind. They apply to a particular individual, given his desires; if his desires change, then they no longer apply to him. The second kind of ought-statements are still hypothetical, in that they are derived from some end. Nevertheless, they are not hypothetical in the sense that worried Kant. They are bas...
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"Conocimiento prescriptivo" de los principios morales según Grisez

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What, then, is the status of these precepts? The short answer is that they are not any kind of knowledge identified by Aquinas; they are what Grisez calls prescriptive knowledge.1 Prescriptive knowledge seems to be knowledge with a moving force to it, but not the moving force of the will; rather, the knowledge by its very nature has a moving force. Indeed, this knowledge is prior to the act of ...
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Indeed, the notion of a shared good is the very basis of authority

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If a man says to himself that he must get a job for the sake of sustenance, then he has discovered a certain necessity from an end. But if that man happens to be a father, then the sustenance with which he is concerned is not merely his own; it is also the sustenance of his family. For this reason, the necessity seems stronger. If he is concerned only with his own sustenance, then it seems that...
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Aquinas restricts coercive power to proper authorities because of the good involved; it is not merely a private good but a shared good or the community. Only the community itself, or its representatives, can order to this good.

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160 why is the power to coerce limited to the proper authorities? Without an answer to this question, the position attributed to Suarez cannot explain the force of the moral ought. It can claim that law is a certain kind of command, and it can claim that command imposes an external necessity upon the will. It will be unable to explain, however, how this external necessity is any different from...
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Le ley natural como principio externo de acción, como verdadera ley

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Natural law as an external principle of action 156 Like human law, the natural law is an external principle of action. Originally, it exists in the one who promulgates, which seems to be God. Aquinas says, "The promulgation of the law of nature arises because God has placed in the human mind the ability to know it naturally.1 With God as the author of the natural law, the external character of ...
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En sentido propio nadie se impone una ley a sí mismo

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154 12. I-II, 93, 5. « Lex est directiva actuum qui conveniunt subiectis gubernationi alicuius, unde nulius, proprie loquendo, suis actibus legem imponit.’ The law directs acts of those who are properly subject to the government of another, so that no one, properly speaking, imposes a law on his own actions.
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Qué siginifica estar obligado

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127 A precept of the law, since it is obligatory, concerns that which ought to be done. That something ought to be done, however, arises from the necessity of some end. Clearly, then, it belongs to the very notion of a precept that it implies an order to an end, insofar as that which is commanded is necessary or expedient for the end.’ 2 I-Il 99,1- "Praeceptum legis, cum sit obligatorium, est ...
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La voluntad tiene como objeto propio el bien captado por la razón, que a su vez percibe la adecuación de un apetito inferior con su objeto propio

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108 Since any desire of the will presumes some awareness of the good, the desires of the will cannot themselves give rise to that awareness. 109 The inclinations of the will always follow upon some awareness of the good; consequently, we must first be aware of the good —by first knowing some other inclination — before the will itself is inclined to that good. For every natural inclination fro...
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Ley natural como ley de la razón práctica

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Jensen critica la teoría del conocimiento de la ley natural defendida por Rhonheimer, porque según Jensen, Rhonheimer dice que las inclinaciones no son decisivas en el conocimiento de la ley natural. Lo que el hombre ve razonable hacer eso es la ley natural, en la medida en que la razón lo dicta como razonable, como una evidencia no derivada del conocimiento de las inclinaciones p. 85 Rhonheim...
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Una cosa es buena en la medida en que cumple su función.

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DESCRIPTIVISMpp. 62 a 654.1.1: ArtifactsPeter Geach has argued that "good" is a descriptive term. It describes the way things are. Obviously, however, it does not pick simple attribute like the color red. While the color red is the same in a knife or in a hammer, what is good for a knife may not be good for a hammer. Still, Geach claims, something common can be found between diverse uses of "go...
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La ley natural es la ley de la razón práctica. El primer principio de la razón práctica es también el primer precepto de la ley natural

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La ley natural es la ley de la razón práctica. El primer principio de la razón práctica es también el primer precepto de la ley natural36 Let us make two more points concerning the first principle of practical reason. First, after introducing it, Aquinas makes clear that it is also the first precept of the law. In other words, Aquinas does not have some broad category of practical reason, under...
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Objeto y estructura del libro de Jensen

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Objeto y estructura del libro de JensenThe journey from "is" to "ought" will follow four basic steps, corresponding to the four levels of reasoning. We will move step by step, beginning with purely speculative knowledge, moving to materially practical knowledge, then to virtually practical knowledge and finally to action. At the level of purely speculative knowledge we will look for a suitable ...

4 argumentos de los defensores de la nnlt en defensa de la independencia del conocimiento práctico y especulativo

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4 argumentos de los defensores de la nnlt en defensa de la independencia del conocimiento práctico y especulativoPrimer argumento de NNLT: los primeros principios son per se notaeEl principal argumento de Grisez es que Santo Tomás dice que los primeros principios de la ley natural son evidentes per ser notae, es decir, no derivan de un conocimiento especulativo previo. No existe un silogismo po...
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Niveles de conocimiento práctico

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LEVELS OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE The dispute among Thomists has centered around the relative roles of speculative and practical knowledge. Is practical knowledge independent or does it depend upon speculative knowledge? Unfortunately, the terms "speculative" and "practical" are often used without precision. What exactly does practical knowledge mean? The danger is that "practical reason" – or spec...
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Grisez se aparta demasiado de Santo Tomás.

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p.7 As the dispute has developed, the new natural law theory has come to be associated less with Aquinas. It began as an account of the correct interpretation of Aquinas. With time, however, it became clear that in some respects it was irreconcilable with Aquinas. Eventually his thought came to be seen simply as the point of departure, and, one might add, a departure on a very distant journey.’...
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Crítica a la teoría del conocimiento moral de Grisez

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JENSEN, S., Knowing the Natural Law, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 2015, p. 4 p. 4 Grisez attempted to achieve his goal by emphasizing one single truth about Aquinas’s natural law, namely, that the first principles of the natural law are per se nota, that is, they are known immediately from an understanding of the terms, with no need for deductive reasoning. These first ...
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JENSEN, S., Knowing the Natural Law, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 2015JENSEN, S., Knowing the Natural Law, The Catholic University of America Press, W

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JENSEN, S., Knowing the Natural Law, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 2015 ditorial : The Catholic University of America Press (30 mayo 2015)Idioma : InglésTapa blanda : 256 páginasISBN-10 : 081322733XISBN-13 : 978-0813227337Peso del producto : 413 gDimensiones : 16.43 x 1.78 x 22.38 cmClasificación en los más vendidos de Amazon: nº9,797 en Éticanº12,530 en Derecho públic...

Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

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Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts Steven J. Jensen, Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts, Catholic University of America Press, 2015, 238pp., $34.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780813227337. Reviewed by Anthony J. Lisska, Denison University ...
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